Today’s portion of Bacon Wrapped Pork Chop (BWPC): First off, I’m no engineer. I’m just some guy with a Twitter feed and a blog. But, I’m pretty sure that doing an aerial survey of a school may not be the most effective way to determine how well that school is being constructed.
U.S. Air Force Staff 1st Lt. Scott Adamson, a civil engineer deployed from Eielson Air Force Base, Alaska, attached to the Laghman Provincial Reconstruction Team, inspects a road from a UH-60 Black Hawk helicopter in the Alingar district, Laghman province, Oct. 7. The PRT conducted an air reconnaissance due to the unforgiving terrain and known insurgent activity in the area. (U.S. Air Force photo by Staff Sgt. Ryan Crane, Laghman Provincial Reconstruction Team Public Affairs)
“The PRT conducted an air reconnaissance due to the unforgiving terrain and known insurgent activity in the area.”
Having been there and done that in a couple of iterations, I’m pretty sure the prevailing logic here is, “Well, it’s better than nothing.” I mean, what better way to engage with the people in a COIN environment than to show them that the terrain and the insurgents are so effective that you can’t even walk the ground to look at a school.
This has been one of the primary failings of reconstruction funding to date, that we continue to support projects in areas that we can’t really reach. I’m assuming the PRT has some level of funding and/or oversight for this project. If so, how effective are we really if we can’t even go look at it?
Ten years in, and we’re still doing surveys by helicopter.
Question: is the issue quality of school construction? Or mere confirmation that tax dollars are in fact resulting in a structure that from the air looks like it could serve as a school?
My apologies…this is a really long answer, but I hope it helps you better understand what’s at stake here.
The issue should absolutely be the quality of school construction, because if it’s not, it’s likely that school won’t be around to be used as a school after more than a few months. Add to that the very real possibility that a poorly constructed structure could collapse and well, kill some Afghan kids, and you’re just making the situation worse.
Now you’ve got a community blaming ISAF for the deaths of schoolchildren, because, and this will happen, they’ll tell anyone who will listen, “They never came to check on it to make sure it was being built right.”
They’ll tell their district officials during construction that it wasn’t being done right, if it’s being done at all, but frankly, no one will likely listen to them. If the insurgent activity is that bad, then it’s possible that there isn’t an Afghan government presence in that area. Or, if there is, it’s cops and soldiers, not educational personnel.
This is then a ready-made insurgent propaganda piece, and the worst part is, it was completely preventable.
It won’t take long for the contractors to figure out that the PRT is never going to look too closely at the building anyway, so they’ll make sure the outside looks good, but then the inside will either be not quite finished, or they’ll just strip out whatever they can use and walk away with it.
Now if the PRT or some other ISAF element ever does show up and sees that it’s like that, there will be a long list of reasons, all of them tied to security: they were robbed, insurgents threatened them and they had to stop, etc.
Since the PRT isn’t that connected with that particular community (really tough to do from a helicopter), chances are pretty good they’ll buy this story, and give the contractor more money to finish the building. Now, since winter’s well on its way (snow in the Hindu Kush today) there’s not too much more time before the winter construction halt hits.
So now it’s likely April (or earlier if it’s milder…even without snow cold temps make work nearly impossible) and you’re (maybe) back, via helicopter, and it looks like it’s about done. About that point the PRT is handing off to a new batch of personnel, and, since there are so many projects to look at (since the PRTs have too many projects to adequately monitor them), that school may not get a look from the new group until about mid-summer.
The contractor will make excuses about security, etc., and will get more money. Now it’s nearly winter again, you make another helo flight, and it starts over again the next April.
So in reality there will be more “tax dollars” spent on this project than if you had established it in a secure enough area that you could monitor regularly and ensure that the school’s being built right the first time.
Finally, what always needs to be considered is that a school is not a building: it’s teachers and students, and, hopefully, supplies. I’ve seen several instances of “schools” that just stood empty because no one was able to support that building with teachers and students. Unfortunately, it’s chalked up as a “success” because, well, the building is done, so there’s a “school.”
If you can’t get on the ground to look at it, I’m sorry, then you’re not conducting a counterinsurgency, and your application of tax dollars is about as effective as pushing money out of the helo as you fly over.
You don’t need to apologize for clarity. As a newcomer to more closely following events in Afghanistan, your short hand comments leave me with question marks. Thank you for taking the time. And bless you for wanting the job done right.